

TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES SUBCOMMITTEE  
of the  
SECURITY COMMITTEE

TSCS -M-99  
23 October 1974

Minutes of  
Ninety-Ninth Meeting  
Room 6E-0708, CIA Headquarters  
Friday, 18 October 1974, 1000 to 1130 Hours

[redacted]  
Chairman  
Security Committee  
Presiding

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MEMBERS PRESENT

[redacted]  
Mr. Jerry Breidenfeld, FBI

[redacted]  
Mr. Sherman H. Delmage, Dept of Army  
Mr. John E. Langager, Dept of Navy  
Lt. Col. Robert C. McGarey, Dept of Air Force  
Mr. Lyle Hofferth, AEC  
Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service Alternate

Observer

Mr. Charles R. Torpy, WHCA

Also Present

Mr. Donovan G. Fischer, Dept of State  
Mr. James Hirsch, CIA

[redacted]  
Maj. Jack H. Nelson, Dept of Air Force

[redacted]  
[redacted] Executive Secretary, Security Committee  
[redacted] Secretary, Security Committee

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[redacted]  
Exempt from General Declassification

Schedule of E. O. 11652, Exemption Category: 5B ( 2 )

Automatically Declassified on  
Date Indefinite to Determine

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TSCS-M-99  
23 October 1974

1. Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 97th and 98th meetings were approved as published. (Please amend the 98th minutes to indicate that Richard G. Cowen/AEC and Maj. Jack H. Nelson/AF attended the meeting.)

2. Interagency Training Center

Mr. Fischer [ ] Director of the ITC, who provided a status report.

The Center's Deputy Director, [ ] has been reassigned and not replaced. The ITC's instructor strength now stands at five with the arrival of Dr. Alexander Chodakowski from the Department of State and Capt. Gregory Holland from the Department of the Army.

The latest running of the Fundamentals and Telephone courses were recently completed. There continues to be a heavy interest in the Fundamentals course. The Signal Identification course is scheduled to begin 21 October.

The ITC schedule for the first half of 1975 is being formulated and will be available early in November. The Director repeated his request of ITC users to assist in a definition of greatest needs so as to identify an appropriate spectrum of potential offerings by the ITC. One suggestion being considered was the use of a questionnaire to obtain feedback information as a basis for review of the Center's courses in light of today's environment. The Director expressed a desire to use the TSCS as a vehicle to conduct the review.

The Chairman said that he had heard many good things about the ITC and commended the Director and his staff for a fine performance. The Chairman offered his assistance in any way possible to further the efforts of the ITC.

The Chairman said that he would like to visit the ITC during early November at a time of mutual convenience. [ ] extended an open invitation to the Chairman and members of the Committee to visit the ITC.

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No Foreign Dissem

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3.  Progress Report

No new information to report.

4. RACE Progress Report

No new information to report.

The Chairman, while deferring to the prerogatives of the new Chairman, TSCS, proposed and members agreed that the Department of State member would continue to report on these items but that reports would be placed on the agenda only when something new was to be reported.

5. Discussion of Requests for Declassification Action

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On 19 September the Security Committee forwarded the requests on the first two items to the Department of State and the last to the FBI which in turn referred it to the AEC.

The Chairman mentioned that the Security Committee was expected to respond promptly and requested a status report by the State and AEC representatives.

State mentioned that they were in receipt of the request for declassification and that they were examining the original material towards a determination whether or not sources and methods material was involved. State said that upon completion of their examination they would respond to the request of the Chairman.

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The AEC representative had no information on the status of the AEC review of the report on the hazardous telephone installation.

The Chairman noted that additional requests might be anticipated for declassification actions. He proposed and members agreed that those departments and agencies with primary interest would continue to be viewed as cognizant offices and be responsible for final determination whether to declassify or not and for providing adequate justification for the determination.

The Chairman also mentioned that in the Letter of Instruction from the DCI the Chairman had been charged to initiate a review of procedures and make appropriate recommendations to the DCI as the means to facilitate USIB compliance with declassification provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order 11652 for those requests made to the Board itself.

6. Discussion of Debriefing of [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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The community continues to have unanswered questions for [REDACTED] The questions being submitted by members of the community reflect problems with the basic coordination cycle in the community. Appropriate procedures for a coordinated approach which would permit a coherent, ordered, debriefing by technically qualified countermeasures personnel were recognized as a current need.

It was agreed that the Chairman of the R&D Group would form an ad hoc group to structure a proposed procedure.

The Chairman said that he would be willing to discuss the proposal with the Chairman, Interagency Defector Committee, toward a goal of insuring a means to satisfy the needs of the community in obtaining information from defectors of interest to the TSCS.

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In the interim period, Mr. James Hirsch, Chairman, R&D Group, agreed to serve as the focal point to collate questions of the community members to be placed before [REDACTED] at the opportunity of the next debriefing session.

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role of the former R&D Subcommittee to serve the Security Committee in the technical security field was a good one. It might offer savings in time and money through its coordination efforts and provide a focal point for technical security problems of the intelligence community.

In the ensuing discussion, questions were raised about tasking authorities and scope of interest.

It was agreed that the R&D Group could accept tasking levied by elements of the Security Committee. There would be an effort to stay away from self-generated tasks and should they arise they would be submitted to the Chairman and the members of the Committee for discussion and a decision. The Group would be initially under the TSCS and would respond through that subcommittee to other elements of the Security Committee.

It was acknowledged that the range of interests might intrude in the area of those military elements responsible for technical and physical security protection of DoD classified but non-intelligence material. The Chairman made assurances that there would be no intent to assume any non-intelligence related security responsibilities. Solutions to technical security problems, hardware proposals, and physical security findings would be available to military or other security elements but would not be binding on them for adoption. In the area of personnel requirements, the organizational divisions of responsibilities would be recognized and no tasking for personnel support would be levied on member agencies where this was a problem.

It was noted that the proposal provided for a six-month trial of the proceedings at which time a review by the Security Committee would be conducted and appropriate actions taken.

The members agreed with the Chairman's suggestion that the next step would be to discuss the proposal with the Security Committee.

The Chairman said he thought the proposal was well stated and expressed appreciation to Mr. Hirsch and [ ] for their efforts.

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
#### 9. New Business

(a) Mr. Hirsch mentioned that the R&D Group's final report, "National Technical Surveillance Countermeasures R&D Requirements 1974-79," was completed. A copy is included herewith.

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


(b) The Chairman mentioned that he had received a request from the US Coast Guard to have a representative participate in activities of sub-committees as a member or observer. In the discussion that followed it was mentioned that similar requests in the past by non-USIB agencies had been frowned upon. It was acknowledged that there may be special cases or events which would indicate that advisability of inviting non-USIB observers and the Chairman could exercise his prerogatives in such incidents. The members were of the opinion that this request should be explored a bit further. The Chairman said he would discuss the request with Mr. Frank Stanton, Director, Investigations and Security, Department of Transportation, and make the results available at a later meeting of the TSCS.

#### 10. Next Meeting

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 scheduled the next meeting for Friday, 15 November 1974, at 1000 hours in room 6E-0708 CIA Headquarters.



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Executive Secretary, Security Committee

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15 OCT 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, TSCS

SUBJECT : National Technical Surveillance Countermeasures  
Research and Development Requirements 1974-  
1979

1. Attached for your information and review is a report listing and ranking technical surveillance countermeasures research and development requirements. These requirements extend to the 1979 time period due to the long development cycle involved in some requirements.

2. The Committee has identified the desirability of reviewing the threat model and is considering the steps that must be taken to effect a meaningful review. Additional requirements or changes in requirements may well result from such a review. No areas have been identified where unwarranted duplication of R&D exists.

3. The Committee would welcome any suggestions or comments you may have in this area.

James V. Hirsch  
Chairman  
R&D Working Group

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**Secret**

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Technical Surveillance  
Countermeasures Committee  
Research & Development  
Subcommittee

*National Technical Surveillance  
Countermeasures R&D  
Requirements 1974-79*

**Secret**

17 June 1974

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD  
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COMMITTEE  
RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

NATIONAL TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE  
COUNTERMEASURES R&D REQUIREMENTS  
1974-1979

June 17, 1974

# NATIONAL TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES R&D REQUIREMENTS 1974-1979

## INTRODUCTION

The R&D Subcommittee has undertaken a review of technical surveillance countermeasures R&D requirements for the 1974-1979 period. The objective of this review was to establish a list of current requirements and to identify the relative importance assigned to these requirements by member agencies. The committee anticipates that this may be of use to:

- (a) individual member agencies in identifying differences between their requirements and those of the rest of the intelligence community.
- (b) R&D components in proposing needed R&D programs and obtaining funding for such programs.
- (c) the R&D Subcommittee in allocating its limited time to items of high concern to the membership.

The list was generated by initially identifying every known stated requirement in the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures area. Each member then ranked each requirement in two ways. The first ranking was based on the presence or absence of such a requirement in their organization. The second ranking was based on whether or not their organization intended to commit R&D dollars to the requirement area in the FY74-75 time period. These two rankings were then combined with equal weighting to provide a net ranking score. A score of 100, the highest ranking, indicates that every agency participating both has a requirement and is going to spend money in the area. At the other extreme, a score of 0 would show that no agency either had an unsatisfied requirement or was planning to spend money in the area.

The committee feels that undue significance should not be attached to small differences in rank order, both since the net ranking scores were very close in many cases and since analysis of the result by the committee does not support that conclusion. In addition, a low rank does not necessarily imply that a requirement is not important. In some cases rank may be reduced due to the success of earlier government R&D efforts.

The committee feels that this list fairly describes the net U.S. Government position on present Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Research & Development Requirements and activities. At the same time, the committee wishes to emphasize that the list does not or indeed probably could not represent the exact priority of needs (or position) of any specific agency.

## FUTURE WORK

The committee has noted that R&D requirements should bear some reasonable relationship to present or anticipated security vulnerabilities, i.e., the threat. Sufficient time has passed since the development of the original threat model to warrant a full review of that area. Additional requirements or changes in requirement priority may well result from such a review.

## TSCM R&D TREE

Attached as an Annex to this report is a copy of the R&D Subcommittee TSCM R&D Tree Book. This book contains several tree diagrams which were used to logically arrange and relate TSCM R&D goals, R&D approaches, and member agency requirements. The submissions of each member from which the net importance rank of each requirement was derived are presented in the Tree Book. Although not shown in the National R&D Requirements list, each member places a high priority on physical security systems requirements as can be seen by detailed examination of the physical security requirements listed in the R&D Tree Book.

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